Tag: Religion

• 

  Breaking the Seal of Confession

  Posted at 10:08 am by ionainstituteni

  Sep 13th

  The Issue

  The seal of confession is one of the most cherished and important aspects of sacramental practice in the Catholic Church. Given the seal of confession, a penitent can approach the confessional and be forthright and honest with his sins knowing that the priest cannot without repercussion betray the penitent by revealing his sins. Effectively the seal of confession permits the sinner to come face to face with God in the confessional, so that the revelation of his sins is a genuine revelation to himself of what he has done wrong and a bringing of these to God (Who already knows the sins in question) in an act of confession whereby the penitent makes himself vulnerable and asks for forgiveness. The confessional is a humbling place because the penitent reflects on himself and discerns within himself his own weaknesses, realises what they are, and determines that he does not want to remain in his sins. As such the confessional is a vulnerable place where everything is laid bare before God, and this vulnerability is one of the reasons why the Church looks upon violations of the seal of confession with the utmost seriousness.

  However, the seal of confession raises an issue. Evidently all sorts of things will be revealed in the confessional that will be uncomfortable. These can range from the perfectly legal yet sinful, to the illegal and sinful. In all of this the priest is bound by the seal of confession, and the challenge is precisely whether or not that seal is appropriate when illegal matters, especially abuse, are confessed. Catholic teaching is that the seal remains in place when illegal matters are confessed, so that the priest cannot break the seal when pressurised by the secular authorities to do so. This leaves one with an uneasy feeling that the priest in adhering to the seal enables the practitioner of illegalities to remain in practice. This is the challenge now placed before the seal of confession in light of revelations of abuse within the Catholic Church.

  A Practical Consideration

  The first thing to reflect upon here is something practical. Confessions are now often held in a confessional box. This box has a screen between the penitent and the priest, and the screen can range from a metal grill to a curtain. Such an arrangement preserves the anonymity of the confessional so as to make it practically impossible to violate the seal even if the priest wanted to do so. With such an arrangement, the value of any evidence gathered from the confessional where the penitent is practically anonymous would be negligible (Jeremy Bentham makes a similar point in a passage quoted below, though not for the same reasons).

  Nevertheless, confession does not have to be so anonymous, and confession can be had face to face. In those cases, evidence collected from the confessional would likely not be negligible, and so the argument is made that in those cases the seal should be broken so as to facilitate investigation of criminal activity.

  Some Precedents

  We do not have to look too far in the secular world to observe something akin to the confessional seal; this is found in both journalism and in the legal profession, though of course to a different extent and with different conditions than that of confession. Nevertheless, in both journalism and the legal profession there is recognised the principle that there obtains a certain relationship wherein disclosures can be made which disclosures cannot be used to prejudice the person at some later date.

  This principle is more controversial and less embedded in the world of journalism than it is in the legal profession. Journalists, especially investigative ones, tend to maintain the confidentiality of their sources, and this precisely so that their sources can feel confident in approaching the journalist with information. Whilst this is a practice in journalism, it is not as well embedded as the same principle is in the legal profession.

  There exists a long-standing legal practice in common law known as professional privilege. The principle behind professional privilege is that a client can make disclosures to his lawyer without fear that these disclosures will prejudice him in the future. Whilst there are certain circumstances in which privilege does not apply, the idea behind it is that if it were not in place and a client could not reveal something in confidence to his counsel, then it would be impossible to have a justice system with a professional class of legal men and women, since nobody could trust such people with their disclosures. As Lord Brougham put it in Greenough v Gaskell (1833): ‘…[I]t is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, everyone would be thrown upon his own legal resources, deprived of professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only dare tell his counsellor half his case’.

  The Confessional Seal

  Turning to confession then, and in a similar vein to journalism and the legal profession, if there were no seal of confession, an individual would be unable to bring his sins before God in the sacrament without fear that the priest would reveal his sins to others. People would gradually cease to confess their sins, and their souls would be lost. As Jeremy Bentham (not exactly a friend to Catholicism) put it: ‘The advantage gained by the coercion, gained in the shape of assistance to justice, would be casual, and even rare: the mischief produced by it, constant and all-extensive…The advantages of a temporal nature, which, in the countries in which this religious practice is in use, flow from it at present, would in a great degree be lost: the loss of them would be as extensive as the good effects of the coercion in the character of an aid to justice. To form any comparative estimate of the bad and good effects flowing from this institution, belongs not, even in a point of view purely temporal, to the design of this work. The basis of the inquiry is that this institution is an essential feature of the Catholic religion, and that the Catholic religion is not to be suppressed by force.’

  What is being enabled is not the ability of those breaking the law to continue breaking it (for obviously the advice and admonition of the priest, as well as legal professionals and journalists, would be not to break the law); rather, what is being enabled is a special relationship whereby one can reveal to another one’s mistakes without fear of prejudice. Such a relationship is somewhat necessary in the legal profession and in investigative journalism, but it is also necessary in the spiritual life so that the sinner may confidently come before God and make himself vulnerable; otherwise sinners will not trust the confessional and will not likely confess their sins. This lack of confidence in and falling away from confession will not only apply to those committing abuse or other illegal activities, but also to those not breaking the law but still caught up in sin and seeking reconciliation. It is the normal everyday individual who abides by the law but finds himself sinning who will cease to approach the confessional if the seal is broken. Hence the need for the seal to remain in place.

  Posted in Blog | Tagged Abuse, Confession, Religion
• 

  Google Doodle Honours Georges Lemaître

  Posted at 6:00 am by ionainstituteni

  Jul 18th

  The Google doodle on 17/7/18 honours Fr Georges Lemaître for his 124^th birthday: https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/who-georges-lematre-google-doodle-12929928. Fr Lemaître was a Catholic priest and astronomer and professor of physics at the Catholic University of Leuven. He held a number of innovative views in physics, but what he is rightly well known for is his proposal of the primeval atom which later became known as the big bang theory of the origin of the universe.

  Fr Lemaître originally studied civil engineering, and after the first world war began studying physics and mathematics. At this same time he began his studies for the priesthood (during these studies he came into contact with Desiré Mercier, the well known philosopher working in Leuven at the time). He obtained his doctorate in 1920 and was ordained a priest in 1923. He also became a graduate of astronomy at Cambridge.

  After his studies he began lecturing at the Catholic University and publishing articles on various topics, in particular on the expanding universe. It was while in London in 1930 that he proposed the primeval atom theory for the origin of the universe, and he developed the view in a 1931 article in Nature, ‘The Beginning of the World from the Point of View of Quantum Theory’, a theory that we have noted later became known as the big bang theory. In 1936 Lemaître was elected a member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and in 1941 he was elected to the Royal Academy of Sciences and Arts of Belgium.

  Towards the end of his life he remained devoted to thinking through issues in physics and mathematics, and this despite the attempt to appoint him to the papal commission exploring the issue of contraception (an appointment that he did not think he was able for given his lack of expertise in moral philosophy or theology). Fr Lemaître died on 20^th June 1966, just after the discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation which provided evidence for his theory of the origin of the universe.

  Lemaître received a number of honours in his life, rightly so given his brilliant career. Today the international space station is named after him, and he is an important figure in 20^th Century physics, astronomy, and cosmology.

  It is good to see an example of the unity of faith and reason in the life of this priest and scientist. The unity is such because what is sought after in both is truth, and it is by means of both that one can arrive at truth. As Fr Lemaître himself states: ‘I was interested in truth from the point of view of salvation just as much as in truth from the point of view of scientific certainty. It appeared to me that there were two paths to truth, and I decided to follow both of them’.

  Dr Gaven Kerr

  Posted in Blog | Tagged Big Bang, Religion, Science
• 

  Morality, Religion, and the Natural Law

  Posted at 10:04 am by ionainstituteni

  Jul 17th

  With the falling popularity of the study of academic philosophy, and the preference for academic subjects that are seen to lead more securely to employment, the public discussion of morality has suffered somewhat. When one comes to study academic philosophy, a course in moral philosophy (hopefully several) is usually essential (along with metaphysics, epistemology, and logic). Whilst one can get a smattering of philosophy in other academic subjects, one rarely gets the opportunity to study it in depth unless one undertakes a course in philosophy. That then entails that there is a general lack of recognition in public discussion of philosophical issues, and this particularly is the case with the discussion of moral matters.

  In general, there is an awareness of some conclusions that are adopted in moral reasoning, especially with regard to hot button social issues that have their roots in moral philosophy. These conclusions did not come from nowhere, and significant voices in the philosophical tradition have offered reasoning on their behalf. But because of the lack of awareness of moral philosophy and often only a smattering of philosophy from elsewhere, the conclusions are known, but not their means of demonstration (indeed, in my experience of teaching moral philosophy, the very notion of demonstration in moral matters is one that has to be neatly and gently laid out before any exploration of the thinking of a particular philosopher is considered).

  Now, moral philosophers are not the only individuals to draw conclusions in moral matters, the Church does so as well. And it is often the case that a moral philosopher draws the same conclusion as the Church, e.g. a number of moral philosophers agree with the Church that murder is wrong. But it is often assumed that a moral position advocated by the Church on some particular issue is one that is defended on the basis of religious belief and not on the basis of natural reason.

  However, the latter view is incorrect. The natural law position in morality that is adopted by the Church is not one that depends on revelation for its cogency, nor does one even have to believe in God in order to accept that position. Indeed significant defenders of the natural law have explicitly stated that it can be known by all without recourse to God; so for instance John Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 48 – 49 states clearly that knowledge of God is not needed for knowledge of the natural law, and indeed he states that part II of his book is an articulation of the natural law without advertence to the existence of God, His nature, or will; Aquinas argues that the principles of the natural law are self-evident, and its further precepts can be elucidated on the basis of rational reflection on human nature (Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, qu. 94, art. 2: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FS/FS094.html#FSQ94OUTP1).

  What the natural law position in morality maintains is that human beings have a nature and given that their actions are rationally willed, in order for humans to flourish as the kind of things they are, humans ought to order their actions in a way consonant with that nature. This is not a moral position that depends on God or revelation for its cogency, but simply on philosophical argumentation, as Finnis, Aquinas and others have articulated it. It stands in contrast to other moral theories, in particular utilitarianism and deontology; and it, like them, is defensible on the basis of natural reason.

  The point here is that whilst natural law reasoning may coincide with the Church’s position in moral matters such reasoning does not depend on religious belief. In that case, the conclusions that the Church adopts on the basis of the natural law are not conclusions immune from philosophical discussion and scrutiny or indeed defence (they are not matters of faith), since they have publicly accessible reasons on their behalf. But if they have publicly accessible reasons, then they are as much up for grabs in the public discussion of moral matters as those defended from other moral perspectives.

  Dr Gaven Kerr

  Posted in Blog | Tagged Morality, Natural law, Philosophy, Religion
• 

  Infant Baptism

  Posted at 10:17 am by ionainstituteni

  Jul 5th

  Mary McAleese recently denounced infant baptism as a form of conscription into the Catholic Church. Her remarks have caused an uproar and generated a lot of discussion. Always in such discussions there are many and varied viewpoints, but two particular themes have emerged in the voices of those who would endorse Mrs McAleese’s position or something like it. The first is that infant baptism is wrong because it inaugurates a child into a particular religion before he or she can make any choice in the matter; the second is that infant baptism is not a biblical practice, and so ought not to be pursued. Mrs McAleese’s objections to infant baptism will be appearing in her doctoral dissertation, and so until I get a chance to look at and engage with that I shall pass over her remarks and focus on the two general issues noted in the public discussion.

  The first issue can be dispensed with quite easily. Outside of the religious context, parents make all sorts of choices on their children’s behalf. These range from quite significant life and death choices when they are newborn, to various decisions affecting their lives as they grow. The reason why parents make these choices on behalf of their children is because children are not mature enough to make such decisions for themselves; yet these decisions have to be made. So for instance, parents make decisions on a child’s diet, home, school, social media access, internet access etc. Not only that, parents in nearly all cases make the unconscious decision about what language the child will speak, what community he or she will be brought up in etc. Parents make these decisions on behalf of their children because they ideally want what’s best for them. The same is the case then when it comes to religion. Ideally parents want what is best for their children, and so when it comes to introducing them to a religion, they often introduce them to the religion that has been the best for them (the parents). This often involves some sort of rite, and in Christianity it involves baptism. But indeed if the parents make the choice that no religion is good for their children because they (the parents) do not think any religion is worth pursuing, that is still a choice that is made on the child’s behalf, a choice the child can reject later in life just as the religious child can reject religion. Hence the initiation of an infant into a religion or not is not itself any more problematic that introducing a child to a form of life with a particular diet, home life, language, cultural community etc.

  We are then led nicely to the second issue. Ideally we make choices for our children because we want what is best for them, and for many that is to introduce them to a religion at an early age, and for Christians this often entails baptism at the earliest age. But the argument is made that such a practice is not biblical, that infants can be brought up in a Christian environment without baptism and that it should be deferred until they can choose it for themselves. But when we look at the biblical witness of the matter, we notice that baptism is associated with salvation (e.g. Jn 3:5, Rom. 6:3-11). It is not a mere rite of initiation, but the means by which original sin is cleansed from the infant. Whilst it is true that the infant has not committed any actual sin, the infant is subject to the state of original sin to which all humans are subject, and thereby deprived of something he or she would have had were it not for being in such a state. Baptism is the sacrament by which that state is removed and the one baptised may be able to enter heaven. Hence the motivation for baptising infants is that they may participate in such a good.

  Furthermore, in Pauline theology, St Paul takes Christian baptism to be the circumcision of Christ, such that those baptised need not be physically circumcised; this was a particularly dominant theme of Paul’s preaching (e.g. Col. 2:11 – 12). The NT practice of baptism has taken over from the OT practice of circumcision. But just as it was usually infants who were circumcised, so too then we can take it that it is infants who are baptised (aside of course from first generation Christians or newly converted Christians).

  Not only that, we have scriptural witness to entire households being baptised, e.g. Lydia’s household in Acts 16:15, the Philippian jailer and his family in Acts 16:33, and the household of Stephanas in 1 Cor 1:16. Hence it was a known practice to baptise children as well as adults, and this no doubt because of the fact that baptism is the primary means by which one is saved in Christ.

  The earliest witness of the post-apostolic Church takes infant baptism as a matter of course, no surprise is expressed by it, the earliest known baptismal ritual makes mention of infants, and it was a practice that had the support of notable Church Fathers (http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19801020_pastoralis_actio_en.html). All in all then the practice of infant baptism is not something new or anything radically divergent from scripture.

  Infant baptism is a practice that is tied in with parents’ wishing the best for their children. Baptism is the sacrament by which the person can be free of original sin and thereby able to enjoy the benefits of salvation. Making a choice of religion for one’s child in this respect is not just about educating him or her within a Christian community, ensuring attendance at a Catholic school, bringing him or her up within the faith; unless the child is baptised, the child cannot participate in the benefit that the sacrament offers. So when the Catholic parent makes the decision to have the child baptised, it is ideally because that parent sees the great good offered by the sacrament, and wishes that good for the child.

  Dr Gaven Kerr

  Posted in Blog | Tagged Bpatism, Catholicism, God, Religion
• 

  The Existence of God

  Posted at 6:00 am by ionainstituteni

  Jun 28th

  The question of the existence of God is one that is part and parcel of contemporary society’s general interest in religion. All religious traditions consider the issue of some divine being, even those which reject the existence of a divine figure precisely because their religious outlook is formed on the basis of the lack of a divinity. The three main Western monotheisms affirm the existence of a single divine being which is the cause of the existence of all things. Nevertheless, there are important differences amongst these monotheisms on how to conceive of the divine being.

  Given the close association of belief in the existence of God with religious belief more generally, it is often assumed in non-specialist discussions that belief in the existence of God is an article of faith and thus held on the basis of faith. Hence, belief in God is often taken to be on the same level as faith in the doctrines derived from revealed scripture, so that if we can reject scripture we can reject the existence of God. But if we look at some representative thinkers of Western monotheism, we see that for them the existence of God is not something that one holds on the basis of faith, but that one can have a rigid demonstration of God’s existence on the basis of natural reason. Indeed, St Thomas Aquinas, a representative Catholic theologian, argues in Summa Theologiae, Ia, qu. 2, art. 2 that the existence of God is not an article of faith but a preamble to the other articles of faith. This is to say, one must believe in God before one has faith, and that one’s faith builds upon belief in God. Hence, belief in God is not a part of faith, but precedes faith, and so is not held by faith. So how does one come by this belief?

  Before proceeding it will be useful to distinguish some terminology. Often the terms ‘belief’ and ‘faith’ are used interchangeably when in fact they are distinct. One can have all sorts of beliefs, and they can be justified either on the basis of reason or on the basis of faith. So I believe that the earth is spherical because I have read the justifications of that outlook and I have seen pictures of the earth from space; this is a belief which is justified by natural reason. I believe that the floor beneath me will not collapse all of a sudden, not because I have investigated the integrity of the building materials or its design, but because it has remained solid for a substantial period of time and I have no reason to think it will not hold good in the future. This is a belief held by faith, since a number of factors come together to bring about my assent to that belief without direct confirmation. So belief is a kind of mental content, and one can assent to a belief either on the basis of natural reason providing a proof or on the basis of faith. Notice here that faith is not the attitude of believing without thinking; since in the belief that the floor will not collapse beneath me, it is hardly the case that I believe it without thinking, because if challenged as to why I believe this I could go on to give various reasons. But crucially the reasons do not directly amount to proof and so do not command the assent that demonstration by natural reason commands.

  Turning then to belief in God, I have noted that in Western monotheism it was not held to be something justified by faith, and indeed we have seen one representative thinker who held that it is a belief that must be in place prior to faith. We can go through a number of important thinkers who all offered demonstrations for the existence of a divine being, to name a view from various religious traditions: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Scotus, Moses Maimonides, Avicenna (Ibn-Sina), Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Plantinga, Lonergan. These figures cover diverse religious traditions: Pagan, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, and range from the ancient world to the twentieth century. Their demonstrations of God are well known and well documented in specialist circles and contemporary commentators on religious issues really ought to be familiar with their thinking if they are to comment on issues pertaining to the existence of God with any sort of authority (even if they wish to reject all such demonstrations of God’s existence).

  But why have thinkers throughout the ages thought that the existence of God can be demonstrated and that it is not an article of faith like the Trinity or the Incarnation?

  I think that what has impressed so many thinkers is the sheer existence of things; the fact that things are but may as well not have been has stimulated many to consider whether or not what accounts for the existence of things can be just another of those things which may as well not be. This observation has often led thinkers to progress on a form of complex reasoning by which they conclude that the very existence of things is not something explicable by appeal to any one thing whose existence is such that it may as well not have been, but must be located in something whose existence is such that it cannot not be, i.e. something that is simply pure existence itself and not an entity participating for now in existence. This insight into things is something I think is to be found in some form in the major representatives of Western monotheism and it is brought to perfection in the thought of St Thomas Aquinas (I defend the viability of one of his proofs in my book Aquinas’s Way to God: The Proof in De Ente et Essentia).

  My point here is not to go into the depths of specialist philosophical reasoning (I have done that elsewhere); rather, I wish to highlight that the question of the existence of God is not simply one of personal faith and so to be side-lined to some private realm. The existence of God has some heavyweight reasoning behind it, and such reasoning is natural, that is to say, it makes no appeal to revelation or private experiences; it simply appeals to realities and concepts such as the existence of things, causality, causal relations etc that any rational person can understand. This then entails that not only ought the existence of God be taken more seriously in the public sphere and not dismissed as a private belief, but that those who wish to dismiss belief in the existence of God as something irrational will have to deal with the very rational and indeed reasonable argumentation of the thinkers mentioned above. At the very least this should generate a worthwhile public discussion wherein views can be exchanged and engaged with on the issue without theists being dismissed as irrational, backwards, idiotic, and without atheists being dismissed as irreligious, sinful, evil.

  Dr Gaven Kerr

  Posted in Blog, Media | Tagged God, Philosophy, Religion

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