Blog | Iona Institute NI | Page 10

- Report on ‘FFA’ released
  
  Posted at 6:00 am by ionainstituteni
  
  May 4th
  The report of the working group on fatal fetal abnormality was released in April. This is quite a lengthy and detailed report. In what follows we will go through some of the major topics in the report which come across as both problematic and not properly reasoned.
  
  Just to be clear on the legal situation, the law in NI is that it is lawful to perform an operation in Northern Ireland for the termination of a pregnancy, where: (i) it is necessary to preserve the life of a woman; or (ii) there is a risk of real and serious adverse effect on her physical or mental health, which is either long term or permanent. The document proposes a change or amendment to the law in some so as to allow for termination when there has been a diagnosis of what the authors of the report term a fatal fetal abnormality. There are a number of problems and inconsistencies with this report which I have gathered under four headings: (i) representation, (ii) terminology, (iii) healthcare, (iv) moral. Highlighting these problems ought not to be taken as undermining the good work of focusing on how we as a society care for women faced with a diagnosis of a serious abnormality or indeed for the child suffering from that condition, and indeed how we as a society can respect the lives of both.
  
  Representation
  
  This report was authored by a working group, not by an expert group. Evidence was taken from experts, but no relevant experts made up members of the group. In addition to that, other than the legal judgements cited which clarify the exact nature of the law in NI, there is no documentary evidence cited for any of the claims made in the document, yet the authors of the document make a number of fundamental claims about healthcare throughout.
  
  The views of healthcare professionals are given throughout the document as if this is the joined up approach of all those involved in healthcare. However, when we look at the representation of healthcare professionals we notice that they are represented mainly by their royal colleges. Not only that, such representation by the royal colleges cannot be taken as blanket representation of healthcare workers, as for instance the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists has recently backed full decriminalisation of abortion, and so as a body they do not represent the views of healthcare workers who do not endorse such a position.
  
  Furthermore, only three women who had experience of the sorts of conditions treated under the heading of fatal fetal abnormality were engaged.
  
  Despite this the authors of the document claim to speak with authority for the majority of healthcare professionals, despite only having representation from the royal colleges. Not only that, they make claims about what is best for women facing such situations having consulted only three of them.
  
  On a more general point, the authors of the document do not take into consideration the views of the wider public on the issue, views of spouses, parents, children, relatives etc of women who are pregnant with children suffering from a serious abnormality. The authors do note the 25,140 people who registered opposition to change in the law in NI, but dismissed such opposition in favour of the select expertise of representatives of the royal colleges (biased in favour of abortion in the case of the RCOG) and the three women who had experience of the diagnoses under consideration.
  
  Terminological
  
  The report gives its endorsement to the term: fatal fetal abnormality and rejects that of life limiting condition. ‘n. 11: Fatal fetal abnormality is an acceptable description of a diagnosis made, usually around 20 weeks gestation, of a fetal abnormality which will result in death in utero, at birth or shortly after birth’. ‘4.22: Fatal fetal abnormality is a widely acceptable description of a diagnosis made, usually around 20 weeks gestation, of a fetal abnormality which will result in death in utero, at birth or shortly after birth. The term ‘life limiting conditions’, which has been used by some participants in the wider debate on abortion law, may include fatal fetal abnormalities but also includes other conditions which result in babies born with disabilities where life expectancy is not confined to the early period but where medical intervention is still confined to palliative care’.
  
  The difference between life limiting condition and fatal fetal abnormality in the view of the authors of the report is the viability of the child should the child be born. There are three problems with the view of the authors in this respect.
  - It is plainly inconsistent with what they say in their own report. N. 11 quoted above states that a fatal fetal abnormality is one which ‘…will result in death in utero, at birth or shortly after birth’, however n. 13 in referring to such abnormalities as grounds for changing the law states: ‘…where the abnormality is of such a nature as to be likely to cause death…’. The inconsistency here is clear. On the one hand an FFA is one that will cause death, whereas when offered as grounds for changing the law it is one that is only likely to cause death. Given this report then, it is unclear which definition the authors prefer. If they prefer the first such that an FFA is one that will cause death, then there must be certainty in diagnostic tools in order to ascertain this (and not just good old experience); but if it is an abnormality only likely to cause death, then the threshold of likeliness must be set for determining this, and the authors offer no criteria for the determination of likeliness. This brings us to the second problem with this definition.
  - The authors form their definition of FFA on the basis of diagnoses made around 20 weeks gestation as describing particular conditions in the development of the child which will result in the child’s death. We have already noted in the previous point the problem over the certitude involved in this definition. But here we wish to focus on the fact that this definition is arbitrary. It does not cite any academic or legal literature on the subject to justify its definition, in which case it is simply a definition made on the experience of those consulted in the authoring of the report, i.e. on the basis of the representatives of the royal colleges, and therefore amounts to nothing more than an arbitrary definition, one certainly not fit to function in any process of legislative change.
  - The authors’ definition rejects ‘life limiting condition’ because it sees the latter as including children who do not have a condition deemed fatal, whereas FFA is deemed appropriate because the conditions involved therein are deemed fatal. But we have already noted that this definition is confused over whether the condition will cause death or is likely to cause death, and the authors of the report do not clarify this issue. Not only that, as noted in the previous point this is an arbitrary definition, in which case there are no good grounds for distinguishing FFA from life limiting condition. In light of this it could seem, especially given the authors’ recommendation at the end of the document, that FFA is preferred instead of life limiting condition because the latter places children suffering from what the authors take to be FFA in the same context as severely disabled children, in which case advocation for a change in abortion law to allow for terminations of children with what the authors call FFA could also be used to justify termination of severely disabled children – and it is assumed that this is what the authors do not want, in which case we have this arbitrary definition..
  Healthcare
  
  A significant portion of the report is devoted to explaining how healthcare professionals, in the estimation of the royal colleges representative to the group, cannot meet their duty of care for women who have had a diagnosis at 20 weeks gestation. One of the justifications for a change in the law to allow for termination of children suffering from what the authors call FFA is that it will allow healthcare professionals to discharge their duty of care. However, there are two problems with this outlook.
  - The law in NI, alluded to a number of times by the authors of the report, clearly allows from the termination of pregnancies where such termination is necessary to preserve the life of the woman or there is a risk of real and serious adverse effect on her physical and mental health which effect would be long term or permanent. The law in NI then does have a view to the health of the woman involved, but at the same time respects the life of the unborn so that its life cannot be taken if the threat to the woman’s physical or mental health is only short term or not serious. Any justification for abortion in circumstances where the woman’s life is not at risk and where there is only short term non-permanent threat to physical and mental health comes at the cost of denying the right to life of the unborn.
  - A number of issues are highlighted pertaining to the poor treatment of women including communication, information, support, lack of humanity/compassion in care etc. These failings in care for women were seen to apply just as much to women who chose to terminate their pregnancy elsewhere as to those who did not. Given the latter, it is not the case that introduction of abortion would alleviate this situation, since the failings apply both to those seeking and those not seeking a termination, in which case the solution is for a better system of care, and not the introduction of abortion which introduction would suffer from the same failings in the care system as we have now.
  Moral
  
  The authors of the report make very clear that they are not considering moral arguments relating to termination of pregnancy, but to consider the provision of health and social care for mothers (n. 5.17). However this is inconsistent with the entire report for three reasons.
  - The report itself is engaged in moral decision making, for throughout it highlights the duty of care of healthcare professionals towards women. It thus envisages the discharge of this duty of care as a serious choiceworthy action, one that merits detailed attention given in the report, and one any failings of which would be considered seriously problematic thereby calling for a change in the law over abortion. Hence this is not an exercise in health and social care provision, which incidentally also pertain to moral decision making, but an exercise in what is the right thing to do for healthcare professionals.
  - Throughout the report the right to life and health of the mother is consistently focussed on and recognised. These rights are taken by the authors of the report as being somewhat basic and self-evident, and hence as goods that healthcare professionals ought to pursue. Given the latter, a moral judgement is made by the authors on what the goods are in this case, in which case they are involved in moral argumentation and decision making concerning abortion.
  - At no point in the whole document is the right to life of the child discussed, whether to dispute it or to affirm it, and this in contrast to the rights and goods of the mother (noted above)) and the legal position in NI which respects the right to life of the child. Such a practiced omission of any sort of discussion of the right to life of the child signifies a moral decision as to the goods that the authors of the report seek to pursue. And indeed failure to consider the right to life of the child leads the authors of the report to make recommendations inconsistent with that right.
  Conclusion
  
  It is right and just that focus in placed on the care we offer to parents in a situation where a diagnosis of a serious abnormality has been made. This focus ought to make recommendations on the analysis of failings within the system as we have it. But such recommendations cannot extend to a denial of the right to life of the unborn; for once the right to life of human beings has been denied, healthcare ceases to be healthcare. The authors of this report have missed this crucial point, and along with the problems outlined above, they have advocated for a change in the law based on ill thought out and thoroughly irrational grounds. Accordingly, we must preserve what is good in the report: highlighting the failings in care and seeking improvement, without in turn going so far as that we seek to deny the right to life of all those within our care.
  Posted in Blog, Media | Tagged Abortion, Fatal fetal abnormality, Life limiting conditions
- The Right to Religion in the Public Place
  
  Posted at 12:13 pm by ionainstituteni
  
  Apr 24th
  
  On 19^th April Dr Gaven Kerr of Iona Institute NI attended an event at which he was a member of the panel to discuss a new animation put forward by the NI Human Rights Commission and the Evangelical Alliance. The animation can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsjhqqCubfw. The event was titled: Let’s Talk About Rights and Religion, and it aimed to focus discussion on the rights based background to religion and its public expression. By and large the event was a success and all of the panellists agreed that greater awareness of the right to religion and its public expression is a good thing. Dr Kerr’s approach to the issue was as follows.
  
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states the following in article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
  
  The European Convention on Human Rights similarly states in article 9: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
  
  It has been elsewhere remarked on this blog the Christian theological vision involved in our contemporary notion of human rights: https://ionainstituteni.org/2018/03/29/christianity-and-the-universal-declaration-of-human-rights/ This is to the effect that human dignity is what generates human rights; and human dignity is derived from the rational nature of human beings. Effectively, insofar as every human being is a rational substance, regardless of its stage of development or occurrent abilities at the time of consideration, every human being must be treated as an end in itself and never as a means to an end. To treat a human being as a means to a further end is to gloss over the person’s rational nature and to treat the human as something that is not human. This conception of human dignity grounds the right to life which is primary in both the Universal Declaration and in the European Convention, but not only that, this conception of dignity as we have said generates all other human rights; and that is no less true of the right to religion and its public expression.
  
  As both human rights documents state, all humans have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This stems from a consideration of dignity insofar as we have dignity because we are rational substances. As rational substances we are free to form our beliefs in accord with what our reason tells us is the case. Thus, it is our rationality that grounds that right. Not only that, included in this right is the manifestation of religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The latter bears some reflection particularly in the context of human dignity.
  
  As rational beings, we form our thoughts and beliefs on the basis of our reason. Thus, we believe something, be it a religious belief or otherwise, because we have reason to believe it. Given that we have reason for such beliefs, we have a right to the public manifestation of such beliefs. But that rational grounding of such public manifestation carries with it an obligation on the part of the believer and an obligation on the part of the state.
  
  On the part of the believer, he or she must accompany the public manifestation of beliefs with the reasons for such belief. That is to say, the believer must at least be able to say why he or she believes as he or she does. This has the twofold aspect of justifying the believer and allowing the non-believer to engage with the believer on a shared rational basis; such advice is indeed that given by St Peter in 1 Peter 3:15 wherein he advises that we be always prepared to give an answer for the hope that we have.
  
  On the part of the state, insofar as the public manifestation of belief is accompanied on the part of the believer by the reasons by which he or she believes, the state has a duty to protect the right of the believer to manifest his or her belief in public in the ways alluded to in the human rights documents above. Thus, simply because a belief is a religious one does not automatically entail that it has no position and ought to have no position in public life. Accordingly, the state cannot justifiably relegate religious belief to the private realm simply because it is religious. Given that the public manifestation of that belief is accompanied by the reasons for such belief, religious belief has just as much a place in the public square as non-religious belief.
  
  It is worthwhile to focus on this right to religion and its public manifestation, not to mention the rational backbone to all of this, precisely because one commonly hears the refrain that religion belongs in the private realm and not in the public. Yet the human rights documents referenced above did not see it this way, and if one looks at the role of human rationality and in turn dignity in the derivation of human rights, it simply cannot be the case that religious belief is essentially a private affair with no place in the public realm. The joint venture then of the NIHRC and the EA is to be welcomed.
  
  Dr Gaven Kerr
  
  Posted in Blog, Media | Tagged Religion, Rights
- Humanism, Religion, and Critical Reason
  
  Posted at 6:00 am by ionainstituteni
  
  Apr 13th
  
  There are a number of tenets central to contemporary secular humanism (for a taste of what such humanists in NI believe see their website: http://humanistni.org/what-is-humanism/). What appear to generate a lot of their beliefs are: (i) the focus on the human being and (ii) secularism. It is important to bear these in mind, especially (ii), since humanism itself is not an essentially secular philosophy insofar many religious thinkers of the Western tradition have given very focused attention to the human being even going so far, as Aquinas does, in holding that the human being is the most significant of all creatures since it involves all aspects of both the material and the spiritual thereby uniting the two. Not only that, renaissance humanism was peppered by many religious thinkers, most notably St Thomas More. Hence what typically characterises contemporary humanism is its rejection of religion.
  
  Setting aside the rejection of religion for a moment, there are many beliefs of secular humanism that are shared with religious thinkers of the past. So for instance the focus on a common humanity that unites all human beings; the emphasis on critical reason for our knowledge of the world, and the defeasibility of the deliverances of such reason; the ability to know what the good life is and the virtues independent of revelation; the worth and dignity of every individual and the need to live a full and happy life.
  
  All of these positions and others have been adopted by significant religious thinkers in the past. It is worth considering the outlook of the representative religious thinkers I have in mind, thinkers like Avicenna (a Muslim), Moses Maimonides (a Jew), and Aquinas (a Catholic), not to mention the pagan thinkers Plato and Aristotle. The outlook that unites all of these people is that rationality is the specific difference of what it is to be human, so that in order to live a fully human life one must live a rational life. In order to live a rational life, one must do what one can to perfect one’s rational abilities, and this pertains to (i) knowing the truth and (ii) acting with respect to the truth. In order to know the truth, one must engage one’s critical reason and in order to act in respect of the truth one must know what the good of human life is and act accordingly. Hence these thinkers can affirm our common humanity, the emphasis on critical reason for knowledge of the world, the process of reasoning, knowledge of the good life independent of revelation, and the dignity of all human beings (though the latter is a position more closely focussed on by Catholic thinkers given their views of the person stemming from the theology of the Trinity).
  
  Clearly then these thinkers did not see any inconsistency between their religious beliefs and the views they hold in common with what are now secular humanists. Part of the reason why they did not see any inconsistency is because their outlook entailed that the existence of God, knowledge of His nature, and the reasonableness of claims made in revelation about God can all be known by means of natural reason (Plato and Aristotle of course did not deal with the latter claim). Thus, these religious thinkers saw the engagement of their critical reason as something that was capable of being integrated with their religious outlook and not inimical thereto.
  
  Now secular humanists may wish to dispute the details of the arguments for God’s existence, the philosophical reasoning by which God’s nature can be known, or the reasonableness of claims made in revelation. If our humanist brethren are correct in this regard (though I don’t think they are, see my book Aquinas’s Way to God: The Proof in De Ente et Essentia, Oxford University Press, 2015), then all that establishes is that in their view such claims are false, not that they are irrational. This is because the religious claims put forth by the aforementioned thinkers are defended by means of the same philosophical framework and commitment to the same philosophical ideals with which secular humanists would wish to reject them. Accordingly, there is no division between critical reason and religious belief, and when it comes down to the claims of religious believers such as the existence of God, His nature, and the reasonableness of the claims of revelation, one simply has to read the argumentation of the religious thinker in question in order to ascertain whether or not the position being put forth is true or false. Thus, one needs to read the works of Plato, the Metaphysics of Aristotle (especially his demonstration of God in Book 12), the Metaphysics of Avicenna, the Guide for the Perplexed of Maimonides, the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas and many others in order to ascertain the truth value of the religious claims made therein.
  
  But this sort of high level and detailed engagement is not something that one sees with regard to secular humanists, since to do so they would have to accept the legitimacy of philosophical reasoning in order to refute such thinkers; yet it is the same framework by which these thinkers establish their religious claims, in which case the claims themselves are not opposed to the rationalist frame of mind of secular humanists. Indeed, I have worked with many atheist colleagues and read their very fine contributions to high level international philosophical journals, and such colleagues accept that religious believers do take the task of critical reason very seriously, and indeed they engage with them in the same journals and publications – they simply disagree that the argumentation is conclusive (as do the religious with respect to the atheist argumentation). But at no point are the rational credentials or the commitment to critical reason in doubt – we are all agreed in our commitment to critical reason, we disagree in what can be established from it.
  
  With that in mind then, the religious claims of the thinkers mentioned above are made in light of critical reason and not independently of it. Given the latter, there are publicly accessible reasons for coming to believe a religious claim (or not). And if there are publicly accessible reasons for accepting a religious claim (or not) that claim has a place in public discourse.
  
  Dr Gaven Kerr
  
  Posted in Blog | Tagged Humanism, Religion
- Sex Education and Children
  
  Posted at 1:14 pm by ionainstituteni
  
  Apr 6th
  
  A major review of sex education is under way in schools in the South, and amongst the proposals it is suggested teaching primary school children on sexual consent, as well as topics on safe use of the internet, the effects of social media on relationships, LGBT issues etc. One of the reasons for this shake up is that the current curriculum is 20 years old now and is believed to be out-dated.
  
  As such the suggestions for review seem quite innocuous, but nothing can be judged until concrete proposals and applications are made. We are unaffected in the North by this review, however calls are being made for mandatory teaching on sexual consent for children by operations manager for Nexus NI Helena Bracken, and a greater focus on the issue of sexual consent has been welcomed by the NSPCC NI. It would indeed be foolish to think that the shake-up in the South will not have repercussions on how we think about sex education in our schools here in the North. On that basis it is appropriate to comment on this issue, and to take into consideration the principles that must inform any sex education in schools.
  
  All the reports of the review in the South express the need for a sex education based on facts, i.e. one which presents students with the facts of sex and sexuality. However, notoriously absent from the proposed review is parental co-operation with regard to sex education and adopting a more pro-active approach to relationship formation in young people. By contrast in NI, Ulster Unionist education spokeswoman Rosemary Barton commented on the need for parental co-operation in sex education, and NSPCC NI commented on the need for education on relationship formation.
  
  With regard to parental co-operation, it is parents who are best placed to make choices on how they want their children educated beyond the statutory minimum level. Given the role they play in the lives of their children, parents have to make all sorts of important choices on behalf of their children, since children at various stages have not reached the level of maturity at which such choices can be made for themselves. Sex and sexuality is a reality of life with which all human beings must come to terms and be educated about, and so it is natural to consider parental judgement on when is the right time and the appropriate manner in educating their children on these issues. This is not to say that there should be no sex education, but that such education must have the input of parents. Otherwise it is left to the judgement of people who do not know the children best and do not have the primary responsibility for the children.
  
  The reports of the review in the South give no indication that relationship formation will be dealt with in sex education classes. Indeed, David Quinn of our sister organisation, the Iona Institute, was attacked on RTE’s prime time for advocating relationship formation before sexual encounters as maintaining a value judgement. Indeed, the suggestions for review in sex education takes for granted rampant sexual activity and simply reacts to that. But if we are to educate our children on sex and sexuality, we need to show them that this is a very real physical relationship that one shares with another, one that touches the individual very deeply and puts one into the most intimate contact with another. Accordingly, the need for caution in engaging in such activity has to be emphasised, and indeed the reservation for such activity with an individual with whom one feels that the appropriate relationship is in place. Within a Christian context the ideal situation within which sexual relations do occur is one in which two people have devoted themselves to each other in both a public and an exclusive manner, and this is marriage.
  
  The desire to educate children on the nature of consent on these issues is itself a recognition of the importance of forming an appropriate relationship before sexual activity. Thus, if the review of sex education needs to do anything, it needs to teach children how to form stable and lasting relationships with others within which both partners feel at ease to have sexual contact with each other. Otherwise sex education is simply reactive to a reality, but does not seek to inform reality.
  
  On the issue of sexual consent, it is suggested that all children need to be educated on this issue so as to ensure the safety of people engaging in sexual activity. Stated as such this view is fairly innocuous; who could disagree that we need to teach children about consent? Consent is a very basic principle involved in moral reasoning, and if we want our children to be morally mature we need them to be aware of consent. But when it comes to teaching sexual consent to our children, we need to note a few things.
  
  First, in a very general way we can explain what consent is and teach children about this. But this must be appropriate to the age of the child involved. If the child is of a very young age, it may be quite inappropriate to teach him or her about sexual consent, since at such a young age it would be inappropriate to teach them about sex beyond a factual consideration of the science of the matter; though of course issues pertaining to consent independent of the sexual context could be taught here.
  
  Second, specifically sexual consent ought only be introduced when the child is at an appropriate age to learn about sex in a more human as opposed to purely biological way. This is something that is only appropriate for a child when they have reached a level of sexual understanding whereby sex is more than just a biological fact but something that pertains to interpersonal relations. The exact age at which the latter occurs varies for individuals and usually occurs during adolescence, hence the need for co-operation with parents. Thus, a blanket application of issues pertaining to sexual consent as part of a mandatory sex education undertaken without co-operation from parents is problematic.
  
  Third, and somewhat as an aside, one of course wants to encourage virtuous behaviour in our children by which behaviour they can relate appropriately to each other, and especially in sexual matters. Thus, we do not want children growing into men and women who believe that they can force themselves on another. However, it is unclear how teaching children the facts of sexual consent will achieve this. If one individual rapes another, it appears to be the case that he or she is aware that consent is not forthcoming but, deplorably, he or she doesn’t care. What needs to be formed in our young children is good moral character according to which it would be unthinkable to force oneself on another. This will of course involve learning about sexual consent at the appropriate age, but it will also involve something deeper – an awareness of the human good and how that can be achieved in one’s life. And the latter can only be achieved when a society forms virtuous people at home, in school, and in public life.
  
  Posted in Blog, News
- Christianity and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
  
  Posted at 11:29 am by ionainstituteni
  
  Mar 29th
  
  We think of human rights today as a fundamental feature of how we relate to other people, and these rights are taken to apply to all humans simply in virtue of being human. This is something we take for granted, but it is a position that required some serious thinking to buttress it, and not even thinkers of such depth and enlightenment as Plato and Aristotle endorsed it.
  
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins by stressing the dignity and equality of all human beings, and this as something rooted in their rational nature. Plato and Aristotle certainly held that humans have a rational nature, and indeed they held that humans have a certain dignity because of their ability to grow in virtue and enjoy goods greater than any non-rational animal can enjoy. But it was not until Christianity began to reflect on the Trinity of persons in God that thinkers started to equate being a rational nature with being a person, and from there to associate personal dignity with all human beings. The history of this kind of reflection goes right back to the influential theologian Boethius and it reached a high point in the thinking of the 13^th Century theologian St Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, following this theological tradition, the dignity of the human person was something at the heart of Pope St John Paul II’s pontificate and in his philosophical writings.
  
  But how did we get to where we are today with the universal declaration of human rights in the second half of the 20^th Century? This is where Charles Malik comes in.
  
  Charles Malik was a Lebanese diplomat to the United Nations, and he was instrumental in drafting the declaration of human rights. Not only that, he was a Catholic and a philosopher/theologian who engaged with the issues of human rights and dignity in his own thinking. The declaration of human rights has the flavour it does with its emphasis on the dignity of every human being as something rooted in their rational nature, not because of some general commitment to equality as the most equitable was of securing rights, but because of the Christian tradition which influenced Malik.
  
  As we have seen the human person is a substance of a rational nature, i.e. it is the kind of thing that is rational. This applies to all human beings, regardless of the capabilities that they have, from the very young to the very old. As rational substances, human beings enjoy dignity precisely because they are things which are ends in themselves and so should be treated as such and not as a means to some further end. Thus, any instrumentalisation of a person for the sake of something else (or somebody else) is at odds with the very nature of the person as a rational substance. This is a position at which thinkers as humane and enlightened as Plato and Aristotle did not arrive; rather it took Christian theological discussion over the Trinity several centuries later and perfected in Aquinas to arrive at this notion of the person. This is the philosophical and theological context within which Malik worked and to which he contributed with his role in the drafting of the declaration of human rights.
  
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights bears the stamp of Christian theological reflection on what it is to be a human person and the rights that follow therefrom. This is significant because the universal declaration of human rights has been adopted by 48 countries, there is an international human rights day every year, and it has been promoted by human rights organisations around the world, including Amnesty international. It is thus appropriate to be aware of the roots of this declaration in Christian philosophical and theological thinking and how such thinking has so deeply influenced our international culture today.
  
  Posted in Blog, Media
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